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Cognitive development is a process from an initial knowledge state at
birth to a later mature one. The problem of developmental psychology is
to describe and explain the intricacies of this process. In “The Scientist
in the Crib”, Alison Gopnik, Andrew N. Meltzoff and Patricia K. Kuhl
approach this problem from the perspective of one theory in developmental
psychology — the theory theory.1
The book focuses on three “knowledge”2 domains: other people,
the natural world, and language. For each, the authors give a general
description of development till the stage where children acquire the basic
tenets of adult competence. For instance, knowledge of other people starts
with a capacity to represent people and an assumption of similarity between
the self and the other. During the  rst year, children know that it is possible
¤University of Michigan.
1Many thanks to Henry Wellman for some illuminating discussions about the theory
theory and developmental psychology; also, to the Culture & Cognition program at the
University of Michigan for my education during the last years;  nally, to Ivan de Araujo,
Michael Baran, Hilan Bensusan, Larry Hirschfeld, Nicola Knight, Brian Malley, Doug
Medin and Barbara Sarnecka for their criticisms and suggestions.
2I’m using italics for meaning or emphasis, single quotation marks for mention, double
quotation marks for quotation or as scare quotes. I put scare quotes here only to alert
the reader who has in mind the more restricted classical de nition of ‘knowledge’ as true
justied belief (Dancy, 1985). However, for the authors, there is no problem: their discussion
of philosophical problems in the  rst chapter supposes a naturalized epistemology — an
emphasis on the context of discovery instead of the context of justi cation.
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to share other people’s perceptions and feelings. Later, they start to notice
differences as well. By the age of two or three, they understand that people
can have different desires and perceptions. Finally, by the age of four
or  ve, they reach a representational view of the mind envisaging the
possibility of false beliefs. In a nutshell, as a result of this developmental
process, children acquire the concepts of perception, emotion, desire and
belief basic to adult naïve psychology.
As far as Gopnik et al’s explanation of cognitive development is
concerned, the  rst component of their approach is linked to the
domain of the cognitive sciences: the mind-brain is a biological computer
designed by evolution. More speci cally, they argue that evolution has
con gured innate programs and a capacity to reshape these programs
during development. For instance, the initial knowledge state of the mind-
brain has a speci c program capable of representing people and a simple
rule of similarity to manipulate this type of representation, however,
during development, the mind-brain is reprogrammed to acquire the basic
structure of naïve psychology.
Evolution has also built in a fundamental motivational force — the
desire to explain the environment: “Explanation is to cognition as orgasm
is to reproduction: it is an intensely pleasurable experience that marks
the successful completion of a natural drive” (1999: 163). But this is the
foundation of the second component that speci es Gopnik et al’s approach:
children and scientists engage the same cognitive machinery in developing
their knowledge. Even if this hypothesis does not apply to the same extent
to all knowledge domains (see the quali cations the authors make about
the case of language), it confers the singularity of their theory.
The authors are not arguing that children and scientists are equal in
all cognitive respects. Children do not use the type of re exive thinking
and do not advance the same kind of meta-methodological concern with
the reliability of the evidence that scientists often do. These contrasts
notwithstanding, the essential similarities hold:  rst, the programs are
theoretical structures with predictive and explanatory functions — e.g.,
naïve psychology has the function of predicting and explaining behavior.
Second, the domain-general capacity of reshaping the programs applies
to speci c domains resulting in domain-speci c theories — e.g., naïve
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psychology and naïve physics.3 Third, this capacity is the theory-building
capacity of hypotheses formation and con rmation; and the transition
between programs is the same process of theory change in science:
resistance to initial counter-evidence, accumulation of anomalies with the
formation of new hypotheses and experimentation to get con rmation.
For instance, two-year-old children initially do not consider the evidence
for the hypothesis that people have different desires because their initial
program has an explanatory rule of similarity, however after the accrual
of counter-evidence, they form this hypothesis. Then, they systematically
begin to do things parents don’t want them to do in order to get the
evidence that would raise the con rmation of the emergent hypothesis.
Finally, the transition between programs is a discontinuous process where
new theories are acquired and old ones lost, which according to the authors
can be neurologically described as the wiring and pruning of synaptic
connections. For example, from the initial-similarity-state to the different-
desires-state and next to the representational view of the mind, there are
two conceptual revolutions.
The most general implication of this hypothesized similarity with
science is that cognitive development is essentially a learning process. Besides
that, it is a social learning process since Gopnik et al make the additional
evolutionary hypothesis that the process is normally monitored, even if
unconsciously, by conspeci cs. And it is a cultural learning process, since
evolution has also built in a strong capacity for culture:
(: : :) evolution can select learning strategies and cultural abilities just as it
selects re exes and instincts. For human beings, nurture is our nature. The
capacity for culture is part of our biology, and the drive to learn is our most
important and central instinct (1999: 8).
The merits of this book are of several kinds. It is a pleasure to
read, because clear and clever. It is suitable not only for the general
public interested in knowing more about their small children, but also
for the academic public who wants to be acquainted with developmental
psychology. In other words, it is a fabulous general introduction to
3For a less radical version of the theory theory, where these two domains are considered
core knowledge structures that are the starting point for theorizing, see Carey & Spelke,
1996.
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cognitive development from the point of view of the theory theory. In
addition, for those interested in the theory theory approach in itself, the
authors show emphatically that they propose its most radical version, one
that intensely pursues the comparison to science and interprets the af nities
literally — it is “theory theory to the max” to borrow an expression from
Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols (1998).
There are already very good discussions of this version of the theory
theory as a theory of development and I won’t recapitulate them here
(see, e.g., the debates in Philosophy of Science, 1996: 63, December, and
Mind & Language, 1998, 13: 3). For those interested in the relation between
culture and cognition, one shortcoming of this otherwise excellent book is
that the authors do not explicate the speci city of cultural learning in their
discussion of learning and social learning throughout the book. Rather than
a criticism to their work, I would like to suggest a complement: in what
follows, I will attempt to connect their discussion of child development
with the general domain of the socio-cultural sciences and provide an
explicit characterization of cultural learning in relation to learning and
social learning.
I start with a necessary condition: the map of semantic possibilities.
The word ‘culture,’ hence the expression ‘cultural learning,’ is used with
a variety of meanings in the psycho-socio-cultural sciences. But if the
ambition is one of rational reconstruction, this diversity can be “translated”
to the following kind of multilevel part-whole ambiguity4 (see Fig. 1).
In the  rst sense, ‘culture’ refers to the set of Xs that are learned. Here
the contrast is to the set of Xs that are mainly determined either by the
universal genetic structure of the Homo sapiens species or by the speci c
genetic structure of an individual of the species. But notice that, as far as
what is in the mind is concerned, this distinction is not homologous to a
mind-versus-brain ontological dualism. As Gopnik et al. say:
People often seem to split the human mind into two parts: a “natural”
neurologically determined part that is shaped by evolution and a “cultural”
socially determined part that is shaped by learning. Studying babies makes us
realize how deeply misguided these oppositions are. (: : :) Everything about our
4A rational reconstruction is not simply an idealized translation. To make an analogy
with the notions of reduction and elimination in the philosophy of science, I will eliminate
some meanings and reduce others by incorporation in my theoretical perspective.
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Figure 1.
minds is the result of what happens in our brains, from the most automatic
mechanisms that govern our breathing to the most re ned, culturally
elaborated details of wedding etiquette and existential angst. (1999: 7)
In this case, cultural learning is equated with the notion of learning in
general, either in contrast to what is innate, i.e., what is part of the initial
state at birth, or in contrast to what is acquired thereafter by a process of
maturation.6 The authors accept that some kinds of mental representations,
like that of people, are innate. Nonetheless, given the fundamental role of
learning in their approach, they reject the idea that cognitive development
could be explained in terms of maturational processes — they do not
accept that the development of knowledge could be compared to the
development of dentition, for example. The intuition behind the distinction
between learning and maturation is that in learning the acquired property
is fundamentally determined by the interaction between the individual and
5The range of ‘X’ includes what is in the mind — mental representations and
emotional states in general —, and public productions of the mind — behaviors and
public representations in general (Sperber, 1996; Strauss & Quinn, 1997).
6I’m not assuming any principled distinction between ‘innate’ and ‘maturation,’ but
only a pragmatic one in order to better characterize the nuances of the literature. And of
course, there can be Xs in the initial state that are a result of learning — for example,
Gopnik et al suggest the possibility of newborns’ having knowledge of their mother’s voice
based on the “muted but still audible sounds they hear in the womb” (1999: 28).
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the environment.7 In other words, in learning the speci c result could
not be predicted taking into account only the information in the genetic
code of the organism. In maturation on the other hand, the developmental
process, even if dependent on an interaction with the environment, is
the unfolding of a genetic blueprint with a more or less  xed timetable
of critical periods. When an X is universally acquired with a more or
less  xed timetable, it is normally dif cult to tell whether it is a result
of learning, maturation or both processes. Take the acquisition of the
representational concept of belief. In the literature, the modularity view
argues for an explanation exclusively in maturational terms (see Scholl
& Leslie, 1999) and the theory theory argues contrariwise. Gopnik et al
say, for example, that because children can acquire this concept earlier if
systematic evidence for its formation is intentionally given, learning is the
only plausible explanation. Whether or not this is decisive evidence, the
possibility of this type of universally learned Xs delimits by contrast the
next meaning of ‘culture.’
The second sense of ‘culture’ is a speci cation of the previous one. It
refers to the complement of the following set in the universe of learning:
the Xs that are learned with a more or less  xed timetable by all normal
individuals of our species. In other words, it refers to all learned Xs except
the ones that are universally learned in a more or less  xed timetable.
In this case, cultural learning is any kind of learning process that is
not an epigenetic learning process. Epigenetic learning is a universally
convergent process that is a byproduct of the interaction between
our normal inferential capacities and very general properties of the
environment. If it were possible to change the structure of the environment,
a different result would arise. For example, all normal human beings
acquire a naïve concept of gravity because our environment gives strong
evidence for this; nonetheless someone raised in freefall on a space station
would not acquire such a concept. Gopnik et al argue that universally
convergent processes in cognitive development are better explained as a
result of epigenetic learning:
7To rule out philosophical examples like the Chinese pill (the ingestion of which would
prompt someone to acquire Chinese) as a case of learning, some non-arbitrary notion of
content should constrain the mode of this determination (for a discussion of this point, see
Fodor, 1978).
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Young children all seem to create similar theories at about the same
age. Some developmental psychologists think that this is evidence for the
caterpillar growth view. But it is also just what you would expect if children
had the same initial theories, had the same mechanisms for revising those
theories, and had lots of very similar evidence. Babies around the world
start out with the same ideas about people and objects, and they will have
similar experiences of people and objects. In every culture different people
will sometimes have different beliefs and desires, and objects will continue to
exist after they are hidden (1999: 159-160).8
The third sense of ‘culture’ is a speci cation of the previous one. It
refers to a set of Xs that is somewhat shared by the individuals of a
social group A in contrast to what is idiosyncratic in the individuals of
A, and is not completely coextensive with any other cultural set of other
social groups B, C, etc., therefore de ning the particularity of A.9 Most
anthropological de nitions of ‘culture’ would  t this third sense, but it is
important to note that sharedness here does not imply harmony between
the individuals of A, nor does it imply that culture is a metaphysical entity
completely independent of the individuals of A (Hutchins, 1995; Mannheim
& Tedlock, 1995; McCauley & Lawson, 1996; Sousa, 1998; Sperber &
Hirschfeld, 1999).10
In this case, cultural learning is a process that converges in the
acquisition of an X that is somewhat shared by a speci c social group A.11
For instance, Gopnik et al show evidence that a newborn has an innate
8The expression ‘epigenetic learning’ comes from Piaget’s tradition. But Piaget did
not accept the type of representational nativism implied by innate initial theories. In the
cognitive sciences, a view of epigenetic learning more akin to Piaget’s anti-nativism is in
Elman et al., 1996.
9The default social group of reference here is a society, but it could refer to smaller
social groups likewise. Note that the noun ‘culture’ (and ‘sub-culture’) normally is also used
to refer to a social group, i.e., a group of individuals that have a speci c (sub-) cultural set.
10But it does seem to imply an externalist construal of sharedness that is problematic.
For a discussion of sharedness and the ontology of cultural kinds, see Sousa, in preparation.
11But an X can also be in the intersection between different cultural sets and even
in the intersection of all cultural sets. Cases of such a universal intersection — e.g., the
know-how to make  re (Brown, 1991) — are not a problem here as far as they can be
“deferentially” shared and therefore are not acquired by all individuals in a more or less
 xed timetable — e.g., if I get lost in a jungle without a match, I won’t know how to make
 re.
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capacity to distinguish the sounds of all languages. Then, by hearing
the sounds of a speci c language, she starts to abstract the prototypical
phonemes of the language. As a result, she acquires the shared phonemic
competence of her social group and looses the capacity to distinguish the
distinctive sounds of other languages of other social groups. Idiosyncratic
learning here is simply the process of acquisition of Xs that are not shared
in a speci c social group.
The fourth sense of ‘culture’ is a speci cation of the previous one. It
refers to a subset of the cultural set of a speci c social group A in contrast
to other subsets of A that are social, political, economic etc., all of them
also cultural, but in the former sense. This sense is in part a re ex of
the division of labor of the social sciences and the consequent partitioning
of their object in different dimensions — the cultural, social, economic,
political etc. dimensions of a social group A.
There are two broad ways of characterizing this cultural subset or
cultural dimension of a social group A. In one way, it is comprised
only of mental representations in contrast to public productions in
general. This is more or less supposed in distinctions like ‘culture’
versus ‘social structure/organization,’ ‘the subjective’ versus ‘the objective,’
‘superstructure’ versus ‘infrastructure,’ that exist in the literature: “By
culture, we refer to the subjective aspect of a society’s institutions: the beliefs,
values, knowledge, and skills that have been internalized by people of
a given society, complementing their external systems of coercion and
exchange. This is a narrower de nition of culture than is generally used in
anthropology” (Inglehart, 1998: 15). In another way, the cultural dimension
of the social group A refers to speci c pairs of mental representations
and public productions in contrast to other pairs that are social, political,
economic, etc. One would say, for example, that the ordinary rules of
etiquette and their consequent behaviors are part of the cultural dimension
of A in contraposition to the political ideas and their consequent voting
behavior, that are part of the political dimension of A. Here, the exact
scope of the cultural dimension is not always clear, but sometimes social
scientists do make such a distinction: “In the United States, for example,
many Native Americans have grown up on reservations or under conditions
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of urban or rural poverty. They have suffered social, economic, political,
and cultural discrimination” (Kottak, 1999: 10).12
In this case, cultural learning is the same type of learning process as the
one characterized by the third sense of ‘culture’, except for the restrictions
on the range of ‘X’ — either only mental representations in general or
some pairs of mental representations and public productions in particular.
And the other social, economic, political etc. distinct types of learning have
their range restrained accordingly.
Now, on this semantic map, which is the appropriate characterization
of cultural learning? As far as the relation with learning is concerned, the
two  rst senses are too broad: in the  rst, one loses the distinction between
learning and cultural learning; in the second, the distinction between what
is shared and what is idiosyncratic in a social group is missing. And the
last sense is too narrow: in one version, only one aspect of the causal
links between what is in the mind and the public productions of the
mind is focalized; in another, only some types of these causal links are
highlighted. Ultimately, for those interested in culture and cognition, all
learning processes that converge in shared results in speci c social groups
should be part of the explanandum. The aim is to explain why such
convergences occur and to discover to what extent they can contribute
to make human beings be different in their minds and public productions
of their minds. And as Gopnik et al emphasize, these processes start very
early in development:
One-year-old babies know that they will see something by looking where other
people point; they know what they should do to something by watching what
other people do; they know how they should feel about something by seeing
how other people feel. (: : :) The babies can use other people to  gure out
the world. In a very simple way, these one-year-olds are already participating
in a culture. They already can take advantage of the discoveries of previous
generations (1999: 34).
And as far as the relation between cultural learning and social learning
is concerned, the answer is already implicit.13 Social learning is a learning
12Notice that the common sense notion of having culture, i.e. being cultivated, is a
further speci cation of this fourth sense of ‘culture’.
13The following remarks are inspired by a distinction between the social and the cultural
that Dan Sperber makes in his latest work (see Sperber, 1999). But note that if one were
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process via the interaction with other individuals (in contrast to individual
learning, i.e., a learning process that does not involve the interaction with
other individuals). And cultural learning incorporates social learning: only
through the interaction with the other members of her society, can a child
acquire its speci c cultural set. In other words, social learning is a necessary
condition for cultural learning. However, it is not a suf cient condition. Not
only because epigenetic learning can incorporate social learning, but also
because social learning is normally a condition for what is idiosyncratic: hu-
man beings forge their individuality only in contrast to other human beings.
Let’s return to nature. In another broader sense, the social is not
suf cient for the cultural. There are species, like (a species of) chimps,
that have some culture, since their social groups have different traditions
of techniques for termite- shing, for example.14 Nevertheless, there are
species, like (a species of) ants, that are social though not cultural, i.e., their
social groups do not have cultural sets, their developmental processes do
not converge to something shared in a speci c social group and different
from other social groups. And apparently these are not even learning
developmental processes, since they are universally convergent and seem
to be mainly genetically determined.
A  nal caveat: the critical reader should not revive and take seriously
the semantic map metaphor, as it were. I’m not supposing well-de ned
lines as in a real map or in a graph — these fuzzy semantic sets could not
be portrayed by Venn diagrams, nor could they exist in a bi-dimensional
space since there is no straightforward sense of a departure from nature.
My intent is only to envisage the possible semantic journeys of ‘culture’,
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interested in making a semantic map of the ‘social,’ it would be, mutatis mutandis, the one
of ‘culture’.
14The third sense of ‘culture’ is the appropriate for cross-species comparison as well.
But see Mithen, 1996, for an argument that this is still not suf cient to attribute cultural
capacities to chimps.
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